SKILLEMALL.ai

CD windows-hardening

Harden Windows servers per security baselines and CIS benchmarks. Configure Group Policy, Windows Defender, and security features. Use when securing Windows Server environments.

sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills Agent Skills author: sickn33 MIT 2 files body ≈ 4 712 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Harden Windows servers per security baselines and CIS benchmarks.

As a process D 49/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches

ProcedureSecuritytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
79/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
74
Quality 40%
86
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
49/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten
This is a copy of a skill from another catalog; the rating counts the canonical one: windows-hardening (sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills)

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 6

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 6
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-disable-security SKILL.md:352
      Disables a security control (Defender, Gatekeeper, SIP, firewall, execution policy) (documentation of a security skill)
      Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring $false
      security skill
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-disable-security SKILL.md:353
      Disables a security control (Defender, Gatekeeper, SIP, firewall, execution policy) (documentation of a security skill)
      Set-MpPreference -DisableBehaviorMonitoring $false
      security skill
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-disable-security SKILL.md:354
      Disables a security control (Defender, Gatekeeper, SIP, firewall, execution policy) (documentation of a security skill)
      Set-MpPreference -DisableIOAVProtection $false
      security skill
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-disable-security SKILL.md:355
      Disables a security control (Defender, Gatekeeper, SIP, firewall, execution policy) (documentation of a security skill)
      Set-MpPreference -DisableScriptScanning $false
      security skill
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-disable-security SKILL.md:376
      Disables a security control (Defender, Gatekeeper, SIP, firewall, execution policy) (documentation of a security skill)
      Set-MpPreference -DisableRemovableDriveScanning $false
      security skill
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:162
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
      $adapters = Get-WmiObject Win3…ion | Where-Object { $_.IPEnabled -eq $true }

    Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "risk"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source_repo"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source_type"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "date_added"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "license_source"
    • note edit-residue the text marks something as outdated (lines 88, 89, 90): check that old rules are not kept next to new ones — the full check reads the text for contradictions

    Process rating: all ten parameters 49/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4712 tokens
    • 100Steps. 20 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 177: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 13 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 20 items
    • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 86.