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Scanning and eradicating supply-chain malware (Shai-Hulud/S1ngularity npm/PyPI worms): IoC scan, OS/IDE persistence, safe credential rotation. Not for SAST (Sentinel) or skill/MCP audit (Chain).

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade D
simota/agent-skills Agent Skills author: simota 7 files body ≈ 5 798 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 h ago

Scanning and eradicating supply-chain malware (Shai-Hulud/S1ngularity npm/PyPI worms): IoC scan, OS/IDE persistence, safe credential rotation.

As a process B 69/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: running it twice

ProcedureGitHubVS CodeAWSSoftware developmentAI and agentsSecuritytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
45/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
27
Quality 40%
73
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
69/100
Nearly there
Running it twice w 4
30
When it triggers w 12
50
Failures and branches w 10
55
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
  3. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 20

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-destructive-fs reference/ioc-database.md:143
    Destructive filesystem command (wipes root/home/drive) (documentation of a security skill)
    rm -rf ~/
    security skill
Medium and low: 19
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence reference/eradication-playbook.md:61
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation of a security skill)
    launchctl unload ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.user.gh-token-monitor.plist
    security skill
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence reference/eradication-playbook.md:62
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation of a security skill)
    launchctl bootout gui/$(id -u) ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.user.gh-token-monitor.plist 2>/dev/null
    security skill
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence reference/eradication-playbook.md:126
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation of a security skill)
    ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.user.gh-token-monitor.plist   # macOS
    security skill
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets reference/eradication-playbook.md:276
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    | 20 | Treat the compromised seed phrase as burned — never reuse |
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets reference/eradication-playbook.md:324
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    | Reuse wallet seed after "cleaning" the machine | Seed phrase is burned the moment it left the host | New wallet, always |
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence reference/ioc-database.md:116
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation of a security skill)
    ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.user.gh-token-monitor.plist
    security skill
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence reference/scan-procedures.md:60
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation of a security skill)
    ls -la ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ 2>/dev/null
    security skill
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence reference/scan-procedures.md:61
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation of a security skill)
    ls -la /Library/LaunchAgents/  2>/dev/null
    security skill
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence reference/scan-procedures.md:68
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation of a security skill)
    plutil -p ~/Library/LaunchAgents/<file>.plist
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc reference/eradication-playbook.md:86
    Writes to a shell startup file (documentation of a security skill)
    sed -i.before-cull -E '/<exact malicious line pattern>/s/^/# CULL-DISABLED /' ~/.bashrc
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-persistence reference/ioc-database.md:244
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation table row; documentation of a security skill)
    | macOS LaunchAgent | `~/Library/LaunchAgents/*.plist` with `ProgramArguments` referencing unfamiliar interpreter (`bun`, `deno`, hidden node path) |
    tablesecurity skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention reference/ioc-database.md:247
    Mentions editing / listing crontab (documentation table row; documentation of a security skill)
    | Linux cron | `crontab -l` entries referencing `~/.config/`, `/tmp/`, or `~/.local/bin/` |
    tablesecurity skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-persistence reference/ioc-database.md:249
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation table row; documentation of a security skill)
    | Windows Run keys | `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run` entries added recently |
    tablesecurity skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-persistence reference/ioc-database.md:309
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation table row; documentation of a security skill)
    | `~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.user.gh-token-monitor.plist` | Mini Shai-Hulud 2nd persistence | `launchctl unload` **before** any token revoke |
    tablesecurity skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention reference/scan-procedures.md:140
    Mentions editing / listing crontab (documentation of a security skill)
    crontab -l 2>/dev/null
    security skill

A further 4 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 5798 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/

Process rating: all ten parameters 69/100

  • 30Running it twice. 35 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, git, node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 5798 tokens
  • 100Steps. 97 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 17 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (13 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
  • +3Description length 194: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 22 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 97 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (5 of 5)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 73.