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BC latch

Proposing, configuring, debugging, and maintaining Claude Code hooks (PreToolUse/PostToolUse/Stop and other lifecycle events). Use for workflow automation or quality gates via hooks.

simota/agent-skills Agent Skills author: simota 14 files body ≈ 5 820 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 h ago

Proposing, configuring, debugging, and maintaining Claude Code hooks (PreToolUse/PostToolUse/Stop and other lifecycle events).

As a process C 57/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

ProcedureSlackSoftware developmentAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
85/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
91
Quality 40%
77
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
57/100
Has gaps
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
20
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 5

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 5
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege reference/hook-recipes.md:69
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "prompt": "Command: $TOOL_INPUT.command. Check for: 1) rm -rf with broad paths 2) Destructive database commands 3) chmod 777 4) Network operations to unknown hosts 5) Package installs from untrusted s
    quoted
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege reference/hook-recipes.md:398
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition)
    Read `reference/security-guard-hook.md` first. Use `permissionDecision: deny` for dangerous Bash (`rm -rf /`, `chmod -R 777`, force-push to main), sensitive-file Write/Edit (`.env`, `id_rsa`, `*.pem`)
    detector

A further 3 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

Files scanned: 14. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 5820 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • note edit-residue the text marks something as outdated (lines 130): check that old rules are not kept next to new ones — the full check reads the text for contradictions

Process rating: all ten parameters 57/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 9 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 5820 tokens
  • 100Steps. 100 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 16 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +4No input/output examples
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 182: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 21 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 100 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (12 of 12)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 77.