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Assessing standards, regulatory controls, and legal-document coverage with cited evidence and proposed wording. Use for OWASP/WCAG/SOC2/PCI/HIPAA or ToS/privacy/DPA reviews; not legal advice or code fixes.

simota/agent-skills Agent Skills author: simota 25 files body ≈ 5 996 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 h ago

Assessing standards, regulatory controls, and legal-document coverage with cited evidence and proposed wording.

As a process B 65/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches

AnalyzerAI and agentsSecuritySoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
88/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
92
Quality 40%
81
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
65/100
Nearly there
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 8

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 8
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security reference/nist-csf.md:88
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - **To Probe**: `DE.AE`, `RS.AN-03` validation through DAST and pentesting.
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security reference/pci-dss.md:47
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
    | 11 | Test security of systems and networks regularly | 11.3 (vuln scans — internal + ASV external), 11.4 (pentest), 11.6 (change-detection) |
    detector
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security reference/pci-dss.md:100
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
    - **To Probe**: ASV external scans (`Req 11.3.2`), internal vuln scans (`Req 11.3.1`), pentest (`Req 11.4`).
    detector
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security reference/regulatory-compliance-reporting.md:136
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - penetration_test_report: "External/internal pentest results"
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security reference/regulatory-frameworks.md:115
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
    - Vulnerability scanning every 6 months; penetration testing annually
    detector
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security reference/regulatory-vendor-risk-assessment.md:36
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
    | Critical | Processes regulated data (CHD/ePHI/special-category), part of the authentication path, outage would cause customer-visible incident in < 1h, **or hosts a foundation model that powers a us
    detector
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security reference/regulatory-vendor-risk-assessment.md:67
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    | Security addendum | Critical / High tier | Encryption requirements, incident notification window, pentest frequency, right-to-audit |
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security reference/regulatory-vendor-risk-assessment.md:100
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    →  annual SOC 2 / pentest summary refresh

Files scanned: 25. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 5996 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/

Process rating: all ten parameters 65/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 5996 tokens
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 91 steps
  • 100Result and completion. Output format and completion criterion are stated
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 19 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 205: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 24 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 91 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (3 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (16 of 24)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 81.