BC gateway
Designing and reviewing APIs: OpenAPI spec generation, versioning strategy, breaking change detection, REST/GraphQL best practices. Use for API design or OpenAPI specs.
Designing and reviewing APIs: OpenAPI spec generation, versioning strategy, breaking change detection, REST/GraphQL best practices.
As a process C 57/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, running it twice
How to improve
- The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 4
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 4
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreference/api-security-anti-patterns.md:29Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| **API5** | Broken Function Level Authorization | Insufficient authorization at the function level | Direct calls to admin APIs, privilege escalation via method changes |
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low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenreference/webhook-design.md:23High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)- `webhook-id: msg_…f4W` — stable event ID for idempotency.
quoted -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:76Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- Security audit beyond API layer (threat modeling, penetration testing): `Sentinel`
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:221Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| Sentinel | API-layer security design (OAuth scope, rate limiting, CORS headers) | Broad security audit, threat modeling, penetration testing |
Files scanned: 22. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
body-longSKILL.md body ≈ 5867 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/ - note
edit-residuethe text marks something as outdated (lines 80, 83, 116): check that old rules are not kept next to new ones — the full check reads the text for contradictions
Process rating: all ten parameters 57/100
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 6 mutating operations with no state check
- 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 5867 tokens
- 100Steps. 90 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +4No input/output examples
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 168: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 19 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 90 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (18 of 18)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 77.