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Managing dependencies, CI/CD, advanced GitHub Actions workflows, containers, secrets, and operational config. Use for build, workflow, or environment work.

simota/agent-skills Agent Skills author: simota 19 files body ≈ 5 957 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 h ago

Managing dependencies, CI/CD, advanced GitHub Actions workflows, containers, secrets, and operational config.

As a process C 60/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

ProcedureGitHubDockerKubernetesTerraformInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
87/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
91
Quality 40%
81
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
60/100
Has gaps
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
20
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 5

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 5
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host reference/dependency-management.md:242
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
    curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install | bash
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security reference/docker-patterns.md:418
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - **Container hardening**: Always use non-root USER, pin base images by digest (not tag), prefer distroless/Chainguard/Docker Hardened Images (DHI, open-sourced May 2025 — 1,000+ pre-hardened images a
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security reference/gha-security-hardening.md:3
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    Purpose: Secure GitHub Actions workflows against supply-chain compromise, privilege escalation, script injection, and secret exfiltration.
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security reference/gha-security-hardening.md:23
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    | Privilege escalation | default or excessive workflow permissions | `permissions: {}` and job-level grants |
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:76
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - DAST or penetration testing: `Probe`

Files scanned: 19. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 5957 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/

Process rating: all ten parameters 60/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 27 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python, node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 5957 tokens
  • 85Steps. 99 steps, 2 vague phrases
  • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 155: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 17 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 99 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (17 of 18)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 81.