BB probe
Integrating OWASP ZAP/Burp Suite/Nuclei, planning penetration tests, executing DAST, and scanning for vulnerabilities. For runtime vulnerability validation. Complements Sentinel static analysis.
Integrating OWASP ZAP/Burp Suite/Nuclei, planning penetration tests, executing DAST, and scanning for vulnerabilities.
As a process B 72/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: inputs and preconditions, running it twice, progress reporting
How to improve
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 18
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 18
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreference/api-dast.md:51Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| PyRIT (Microsoft) | Multi-turn / multi-modal LLM red teaming (crescendo, TAP) | Integrates with Azure AI Foundry; pairs with Burp for hybrid API + LLM tests |
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreference/pentest-methodology-pitfalls.md:1Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (test fixture / example file)# Penetration Testing Methodology Pitfalls
fixture -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreference/pentest-methodology-pitfalls.md:22Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (test fixture / example file)| `PT-06` | Skip post-exploitation thinking | Lateral movement risk stays hidden | Assess privilege escalation and impact paths safely |
fixture -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreference/pentest-methodology-pitfalls.md:41Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (test fixture / example file)| `PTES` | Lifecycle management and end-to-end pentest structure | 2014 baseline still widely cited; supplement with newer guides |
fixture -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreference/pentest-methodology-pitfalls.md:57Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition; test fixture / example file)| AI / LLM / Agent integrations | Wallarm: 2,185 AI-related vulns in 2025, **36% overlap with API vulns**; **315 MCP-related vulns** with 270% Q2→Q3 growth. Prompt injection (LLM01), indirect injectio
detectorfixture -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreference/recon.md:9Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- **Probe `recon`**: passive / low-touch recon. Output is an inventory (assets, tech, exposures, leaked secrets) — not a penetration test. No exploitation, no credential spraying, no active scanning o
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreference/recon.md:10Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- **Breach**: full red-team engagement including initial access, lateral movement, and objective achievement. `recon` is the first phase Breach would run, broken out as an explicit standalone delivera
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreference/recon.md:12Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)- **Other Probe recipes** (`zap`/`burp`/`nuclei`/`api`/`mobile`/`pentest`): active DAST. `recon` feeds them a target list; it never attacks.
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreference/recon.md:64Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)→ recommend next: `pentest` / `zap` / `api` / `mobile` for prioritized active follow-up
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreference/recon.md:92Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)- Recommend org-side rotation and MFA rollout; defer authenticated validation to a scoped `pentest` engagement.
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreference/vulnerability-testing-patterns.md:121Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (test fixture / example file; quoted — discussed, not commanded)- `pentest`: Full PLAN→REPORT engagement. Scope, authorization, threat model, attack-path chaining. Output is a complete assessment report with CVSS v4.0, SLAs, and agent handoffs.
fixturequoted -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreference/vulnerability-testing-patterns.md:124Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (test fixture / example file)- `recon`: Passive-by-default external attack-surface mapping. Output is an inventory, NOT a pentest — no exploitation, no auth attempts, no active vuln scans without separate written scope. Subfinder
fixture -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:23Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- Breach -> Probe: Red team scenarios requiring DAST validation
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:39Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)Probe is the dynamic security testing specialist. Use it to prove exploitability in running systems, validate static findings from Sentinel, design penetration test plans, and produce actionable DAST
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:45Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- ZAP (v2.17.0), Burp Suite, Nuclei (v3.8.0 — pin against CVE-…405 and its GHSA follow-ups), DAST, pentesting, or runtime exploit verification. Version/tooling detail -> `reference/zap-scanning-
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:51Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- Attack-path analysis — chaining identity abuse, misconfigurations, and privilege escalation into full compromise proof
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:59Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- Red team scenario design or threat modeling → **Breach**
A further 1 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.
Files scanned: 14. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when") - warning
body-longSKILL.md body ≈ 5735 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
Process rating: all ten parameters 72/100
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Running it twice. 13 mutating operations with no state check
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 60Failures and branches. 2 branches
- 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 5735 tokens
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 85 steps
- 100Result and completion. Output format and completion criterion are stated
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low 18 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 194: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 24 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 85 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (2 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (13 of 13)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 69.