SKILLEMALL.ai

BB probe

Integrating OWASP ZAP/Burp Suite/Nuclei, planning penetration tests, executing DAST, and scanning for vulnerabilities. For runtime vulnerability validation. Complements Sentinel static analysis.

simota/agent-skills Agent Skills author: simota 14 files body ≈ 5 735 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com analyzed 2 h ago

Integrating OWASP ZAP/Burp Suite/Nuclei, planning penetration tests, executing DAST, and scanning for vulnerabilities.

As a process B 72/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: inputs and preconditions, running it twice, progress reporting

IntegrationKubernetesGoogle CloudAzureSecurityAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
77/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
82
Quality 40%
69
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
72/100
Nearly there
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
  2. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 18

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 18
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security reference/api-dast.md:51
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    | PyRIT (Microsoft) | Multi-turn / multi-modal LLM red teaming (crescendo, TAP) | Integrates with Azure AI Foundry; pairs with Burp for hybrid API + LLM tests |
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security reference/pentest-methodology-pitfalls.md:1
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (test fixture / example file)
    # Penetration Testing Methodology Pitfalls
    fixture
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security reference/pentest-methodology-pitfalls.md:22
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (test fixture / example file)
    | `PT-06` | Skip post-exploitation thinking | Lateral movement risk stays hidden | Assess privilege escalation and impact paths safely |
    fixture
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security reference/pentest-methodology-pitfalls.md:41
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (test fixture / example file)
    | `PTES` | Lifecycle management and end-to-end pentest structure | 2014 baseline still widely cited; supplement with newer guides |
    fixture
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security reference/pentest-methodology-pitfalls.md:57
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition; test fixture / example file)
    | AI / LLM / Agent integrations | Wallarm: 2,185 AI-related vulns in 2025, **36% overlap with API vulns**; **315 MCP-related vulns** with 270% Q2→Q3 growth. Prompt injection (LLM01), indirect injectio
    detectorfixture
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security reference/recon.md:9
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - **Probe `recon`**: passive / low-touch recon. Output is an inventory (assets, tech, exposures, leaked secrets) — not a penetration test. No exploitation, no credential spraying, no active scanning o
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security reference/recon.md:10
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - **Breach**: full red-team engagement including initial access, lateral movement, and objective achievement. `recon` is the first phase Breach would run, broken out as an explicit standalone delivera
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security reference/recon.md:12
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
    - **Other Probe recipes** (`zap`/`burp`/`nuclei`/`api`/`mobile`/`pentest`): active DAST. `recon` feeds them a target list; it never attacks.
    detector
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security reference/recon.md:64
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
    →  recommend next: `pentest` / `zap` / `api` / `mobile` for prioritized active follow-up
    detector
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security reference/recon.md:92
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
    - Recommend org-side rotation and MFA rollout; defer authenticated validation to a scoped `pentest` engagement.
    detector
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security reference/vulnerability-testing-patterns.md:121
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (test fixture / example file; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - `pentest`: Full PLAN→REPORT engagement. Scope, authorization, threat model, attack-path chaining. Output is a complete assessment report with CVSS v4.0, SLAs, and agent handoffs.
    fixturequoted
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security reference/vulnerability-testing-patterns.md:124
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (test fixture / example file)
    - `recon`: Passive-by-default external attack-surface mapping. Output is an inventory, NOT a pentest — no exploitation, no auth attempts, no active vuln scans without separate written scope. Subfinder
    fixture
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:23
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - Breach -> Probe: Red team scenarios requiring DAST validation
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:39
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    Probe is the dynamic security testing specialist. Use it to prove exploitability in running systems, validate static findings from Sentinel, design penetration test plans, and produce actionable DAST 
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:45
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - ZAP (v2.17.0), Burp Suite, Nuclei (v3.8.0 — pin against CVE-…405 and its GHSA follow-ups), DAST, pentesting, or runtime exploit verification. Version/tooling detail -> `reference/zap-scanning-
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:51
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - Attack-path analysis — chaining identity abuse, misconfigurations, and privilege escalation into full compromise proof
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:59
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - Red team scenario design or threat modeling → **Breach**

A further 1 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

Files scanned: 14. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 5735 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/

Process rating: all ten parameters 72/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 13 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Failures and branches. 2 branches
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 5735 tokens
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 85 steps
  • 100Result and completion. Output format and completion criterion are stated
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 18 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 194: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 24 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 85 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (2 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (13 of 13)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 69.