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CB errors-api-e2e

End-to-end smoke test for the public Errors HTTP API (error groups). Seeds failed runs into ClickHouse so the error materialized views populate, then drives the real endpoints against the running webapp — list (with filters + pagination), retrieve, resolve/ignore/unresolve, the `filter[error]` runs filter, user attribution via the `trigger.dev mint-token` -> JWT exchange, and the 401/403/404 negatives. Use for "smoke test the errors API", "test the errors API e2e", "prove the errors endpoints work", or to re-verify after changes.

triggerdotdev/trigger.dev Agent Skills author: triggerdotdev Apache-2.0 1 file body ≈ 3 323 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 6 d ago

End-to-end smoke test for the public Errors HTTP API (error groups).

As a process B 66/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, progress reporting

IntegrationPostgreSQLSoftware developmentData and analyticstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
86/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
85
Quality 40%
87
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
66/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 3

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 3
    • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
      Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
      allowed-tools: Read Bash
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:158
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      ENVJWT=$(curl -sS -X POST "$B/api/v1/projects/$REF/dev/jwt" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:178
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      READJWT=$(curl -sS -X POST "$B/api/v1/projects/$REF/dev/jwt" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \

    Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 66/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
    • 100Steps. 13 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3323 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
    • low The response is described with custom markup (3 tags): a typed call is more reliable

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +5Description quotes 3 example trigger phrases
    • +3Description length 535: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 13 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 13 items
    • +4Has examples (11 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 87.