SKILLEMALL.ai

CC webmcp-gen

Build and validate experimental WebMCP tools for an existing web page. Use when an agent needs to expose a site's real workflows as page tools, create webmcp.init.js, define deterministic checks, or compare WebMCP with accessibility-tree automation.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
vercel-labs/agent-browser Agent Skills author: vercel-labs Apache-2.0 1 file body ≈ 671 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 6 d ago

Build and validate experimental WebMCP tools for an existing web page.

As a process C 64/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

AnalyzerAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
84/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
82
Quality 40%
87
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
64/100
Has gaps
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Exfiltration
If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store SKILL.md:46
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    Generated code must exclude credentials, cookies, bearer tokens, API keys, and local-storage secrets. Pass required user data only as explicit tool arguments. A missing or false `readOnlyHint` in page

Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

Process rating: all ten parameters 64/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
  • 100Steps. 7 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 671 tokens
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 249: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 5 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 7 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (2 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 87.