FB openviking-skills
Find, use, create, install, share, update, and migrate agent skills stored in OpenViking (viking://~/skills and viking://agent/skills). Use it when a search result, or the session's <available-skills> list where the harness injects one, names a skill that fits the task; when a task looks like one a stored skill would cover; when the user asks to write, save, install, or share a skill from text, a Git repository, or a local folder; when a skill should work in every harness and on every machine; or when the user wants to move local skills (~/.claude/skills, ~/.agents/skills, ~/.cursor/skills) into OpenViking — "upload my skills", "save this as a skill", "迁移本地 skill", "把 skill 存到 OpenViking", "新建一个 skill". Covers the add_skill tool, running a skill's helper files, and which local skills must stay local.
Find, use, create, install, share, update, and migrate agent skills stored in OpenViking (viking://~/skills and viking://agent/skills).
As a process B 65/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
How to improve
- Remove the critical guard findings (secrets, dangerous commands, hidden instructions): while they stand the skill is blocked and cannot grade above F.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 1
-
critical Exfiltration
exfil-post-credential-fileSKILL.md:119Uploads a credential/secret file to a remote endpoint (quoted — discussed, not commanded)then `curl -sS -F "file=@/tmp/<name>.zip" "<upload url>"` and delete the
quoted
Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 65/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 30Running it twice. 14 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
- 100Steps. 42 steps
- 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
- 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2347 tokens
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- high The skill tells the model to perform an irreversible action with no human approval
- low The response is described with custom markup (28 tags): a typed call is more reliable
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 811: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +5Description quotes 5 example trigger phrases
- +4Structure: 9 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 42 items
- +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 86.