BC integrity-forensics
Run the Anti-Autoresearch integrity-forensics sweep (span-anchored evidence ledger → GPT auditors propose findings → a rules-only reporter that lists every proposal with what the auditor said about it) against a paper via a SHA-pinned thin launcher — then convert the verdict into a typed policy gate (BLOCK/WARN/NO_NEW_BLOCKER) and an append-only obligations ledger. Use when user says "integrity forensics", "forensic audit this paper", "投稿前自查诚信", "审这篇论文的诚信", or says "anti-autoresearch" when the upstream repo's own skills are not installed. Also invoked by /paper-writing (submission self-forensics, default ON), /peer-review (forensic appendix), /resubmit-pipeline.
Run the Anti-Autoresearch integrity-forensics sweep (span-anchored evidence ledger → GPT auditors propose findings → a rules-only reporter that lists every…
As a process C 61/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.
Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 1
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 1
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medium Broad scope
meta-broad-allowed-toolsSKILL.md:1Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash(*)allowed-tools: Bash(*) Read Write Grep Glob mcp__codex__codex
Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 61/100
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 40Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4032 tokens
- 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
- 100Steps. 21 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +5Description quotes 5 example trigger phrases
- +3Description length 670: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 11 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 21 items
- +4Has examples (3 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 89.