SKILLEMALL.ai

BB paper-compile

Compile LaTeX paper to PDF, fix errors, and verify output. Use when user says "编译论文", "compile paper", "build PDF", "生成PDF", or wants to compile LaTeX into a submission-ready PDF.

wanshuiyin/Auto-claude-code-research-in-sleep Claude Code author: wanshuiyin MIT 1 file body ≈ 2 420 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 6 d ago

Compile LaTeX paper to PDF, fix errors, and verify output.

As a process B 70/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers

AnalyzerLaTeXPDFSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
93/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
89
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
70/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
20
Failures and branches w 10
65
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
      Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash(*)
      allowed-tools: Bash(*) Read Write Edit Grep Glob

    Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 70/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 65Failures and branches. 3 branches
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
    • 100Steps. 34 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2420 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • high The skill tells the model to perform an irreversible action with no human approval

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +5Description quotes 2 example trigger phrases
    • +3Description length 179: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 14 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 34 items
    • +4Has examples (16 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 89.