SKILLEMALL.ai

BB run-experiment

Deploy and run ML experiments on local, remote, Vast.ai, or Modal serverless GPU. Use when user says "run experiment", "deploy to server", "跑实验", or needs to launch training jobs.

wanshuiyin/Auto-claude-code-research-in-sleep Claude Code author: wanshuiyin MIT 1 file body ≈ 3 111 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Deploy and run ML experiments on local, remote, Vast.ai, or Modal serverless GPU. Use when user says "run experiment", "deploy to server", "跑实验", or needs to…

As a process B 65/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureInfrastructureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
91/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
85
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
65/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
      Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash(*)
      allowed-tools: Bash(*) Read Grep Glob Edit Write Skill(serverless-modal)

    Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note edit-residue the text marks something as outdated (lines 101): check that old rules are not kept next to new ones — the full check reads the text for contradictions

    Process rating: all ten parameters 65/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
    • 100Steps. 40 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3111 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -4Absolute local paths (C:\Users, /home/…): not portable
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +5Description quotes 2 example trigger phrases
    • +3Description length 179: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 19 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 40 items
    • +4Has examples (21 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 85.