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Battle-tested Playwright patterns for E2E, API, component, visual, accessibility, and security testing. Covers locators, assertions, fixtures, network mocking, auth flows, debugging, and framework recipes for React, Next.js, Vue, and Angular. TypeScript and JavaScript.

zebbern/claude-code-guide Agent Skills author: zebbern 47 files body ≈ 1 865 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Battle-tested Playwright patterns for E2E, API, component, visual, accessibility, and security testing.

As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationPlaywrightSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
70/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
72
Quality 40%
68
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
51/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Secrets in code medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.

For the author

The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 20

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 20
  • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store authentication.md:1354
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (documentation of a security skill)
    **Cause**: Some auth flows set cookies with `SameSite=Strict` or use browser-specific cookie behavior. Chromium and Firefox handle third-party cookies differently.
    security skill
  • medium Secrets in code secret-labelled-token third-party-integrations.md:507
    Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential)
    // Secret key: 6LeI…JWe
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal auth-flows.md:589
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)
    editor: { email: "ed…@….com", password: "Edit…123!" },
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal auth-flows.md:590
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)
    viewer: { email: "vi…@….com", password: "View…123!" },
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal auth-flows.md:951
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)
    password: "Secu…123!",
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal configuration.md:532
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)
    API_KEY=stag…789
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal test-architecture.md:233
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (test fixture / example file)
    password: 's3cure!Pass',
    fixture
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal test-architecture.md:283
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (test fixture / example file)
    password: "s3cure!Pass",
    fixture
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal test-data-management.md:104
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (test fixture / example file)
    password: "SecureP@ss123!",
    fixture
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal test-data-management.md:153
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (test fixture / example file)
    password: "SecureP@ss123!",
    fixture
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal third-party-integrations.md:182
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)
    client_secret: "pi_m…456",
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token third-party-integrations.md:506
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    // Site key: 6LeI…KhI (always passes)
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token third-party-integrations.md:507
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    // Secret key: 6LeI…JWe
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal when-to-mock.md:65
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (test fixture / example file)
    clientSecret: "pi_m…123",
    fixture
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal when-to-mock.md:118
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (test fixture / example file)
    clientSecret: "pi_m…123",
    fixture
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal when-to-mock.md:782
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (test fixture / example file)
    clientSecret: "pi_m…123",
    fixture
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal when-to-mock.md:811
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (test fixture / example file)
    clientSecret: "pi_m…123",
    fixture

A further 3 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

Files scanned: 47. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (playwright-core) differs from the folder (core)
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 10 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1865 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +4No input/output examples
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 269: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 8 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 10 items

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 68.