BC competition-linux-credential-pivot
Internal downstream skill for ctf-sandbox-orchestrator. CTF-sandbox workflow for Linux credential artifacts, service tokens, SSH material, cloud and container secrets, socket-level trust, and host-to-host pivot chains. Use when the user asks to trace Linux auth artifacts, accepted token or key replay, socket or service-account trust edges, sudo or capability abuse, or explain lateral movement across Linux challenge nodes. Use only after `$ctf-sandbox-orchestrator` has already established sandbox assumptions and routed here.
Internal downstream skill for ctf-sandbox-orchestrator.
As a process C 52/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 5
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 5
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low Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegereferences/linux-credential-pivot.md:6Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)- Env vars, config files, systemd units, sudoers, capabilities, setuid binaries
security skill -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/linux-credential-pivot.md:21Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- Effect side: privilege change, new shell, control-plane action, lateral movement
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/linux-credential-pivot.md:26Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- Mixing local privilege escalation and lateral movement in one vague chain
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:3Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)description: Internal downstream skill for ctf-sandbox-orchestrator. CTF-sandbox workflow for Linux credential artifacts, service tokens, SSH material, cloud and container secrets, socket-level trust,
A further 1 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.
Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 52/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (node) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
- 100Steps. 18 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 565 tokens
- 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +4No input/output examples
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 529: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 8 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 18 items
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.