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BD hardware-security

Use for authorized hardware and embedded interface security research including UART/JTAG discovery, debug pad triage, secure boot overview, and offline firmware extraction support.

zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill Agent Skills author: zhaoxuya520 MIT 2 files body ≈ 210 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 6 d ago

Use for authorized hardware and embedded interface security research including UART/JTAG discovery, debug pad triage, secure boot overview, and offline…

As a process D 46/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureSoftware developmentSecuritytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
93/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
97
Quality 40%
88
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
46/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 3

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 3
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:12
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      3. `NEXT`: 联合 firmware-pentest 做镜像分析
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:29
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      □ 提取镜像 → 交接 firmware-pentest / ghidra
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:44
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      - `../firmware-pentest/` `../ot-ics/`
      quoted

    Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 13 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 210 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 180: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 8 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 13 items
    • +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 88.