BC pkpd-modeling
Pharmacokinetic and pharmacodynamic modelling and simulation - non-compartmental analysis, compartmental and population PK, PK/PD and exposure-response, TMDD, PBPK orientation, bioequivalence, allometric scaling and first-in-human dose, drug interaction prediction, and Bayesian therapeutic drug monitoring. Use when analysing concentration-time data, deriving exposure metrics, fitting PK or PD models, or evaluating dosing regimens. Triggers include "pharmacokinetics", "pharmacodynamics", "PK/PD", "NCA", "non-compartmental", "AUC", "Cmax", "lambda z", "half-life", "clearance", "volume of distribution", "compartmental model", "population PK", "popPK", "NONMEM", "nlmixr2", "Pharmpy", "Monolix", "exposure-response", "Emax", "EC50", "indirect response", "effect compartment", "TMDD", "PBPK", "bioequivalence", "RSABE", "ABEL", "allometric scaling", "first-in-human", "MABEL", "drug-drug interaction", "DDI", "ICH M12", "concentration-QTc", "therapeutic drug monitoring", "MIPD", and "dosing regimen".
Pharmacokinetic and pharmacodynamic modelling and simulation - non-compartmental analysis, compartmental and population PK, PK/PD and exposure-response, TMDD…
As a process C 61/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.
Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 1
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 1
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medium Broad scope
meta-broad-allowed-toolsSKILL.md:1Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bashallowed-tools: Read Write Edit Bash
Files scanned: 28. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 61/100
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
- 40Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
- 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4029 tokens
- 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
- 100Steps. 8 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 1004: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -32 of 11 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +2Single-language instructions
- +5Description quotes 24 example trigger phrases
- +4Structure: 16 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 8 items
- +4Has examples (10 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (14 of 14)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 88.