SKILLEMALL.ai
GitHub ↗ RU Sign in

CD BrainX V5 — The First Brain for OpenClaw

Vector memory engine with PostgreSQL + pgvector + OpenAI embeddings. Stores, searches, and injects contextual memories into LLM prompts. Includes auto-injection hook for OpenClaw and full backup/recovery system.

LeoYeAI/openclaw-master-skills Agent Skills author: LeoYeAI MIT 73 files · 7 scripts body ≈ 4 294 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 d ago

Vector memory engine with PostgreSQL + pgvector + OpenAI embeddings.

As a process D 38/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches

IntegrationPostgreSQLAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
70/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
68
Quality 40%
74
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
38/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Secrets in code medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.

For the author

The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 12

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 12
    • medium Secrets in code secret-private-key README.md:793
      Private key material (detector / deny-list definition; key header without key body; documentation table row)
      | `private_key_block` | `-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …
      detectorheader onlytable
    • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key scripts/learning-detail-extractor.js:18
      Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
      API key + configurable base URL from environment
    • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key scripts/pattern-detector.js:16
      Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
      API key + configurable base URL from environment
    • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key scripts/session-snapshot.js:23
      Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
      API key + configurable base URL from environment
    • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key scripts/trajectory-recorder.js:21
      Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
      API key + configurable base URL from environment
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:159
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…hAG+OAW+HQPZ6n++TNDUX+L0+uUlL…1Zm+zTCj…9vK/Q==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:189
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…jiu+MWhy…KK0/Cjtr…D82/mCWb…AEQ==",
      detector
    • low Exfiltration read-dotenv README.md:509
      Reads a .env file (documentation of a security skill)
      cp .env.example .env
      security skill
    • low Secrets in code secret-aws-key README.md:788
      AWS access key ID (placeholder value)
      | `aws_access_key` | `AKIA…PLE` |
      placeholder
    • low Exfiltration read-dotenv scripts/restore-brainx.sh:323
      Reads a .env file (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      echo "   cat ~/.openclaw/.env | grep -E 'DATABASE_URL|OPENAI_API_KEY'"
      quoted

    A further 2 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

    Files scanned: 68. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • warning name-format name should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)
    • note edit-residue the text marks something as outdated (lines 20): check that old rules are not kept next to new ones — the full check reads the text for contradictions

    Process rating: all ten parameters 38/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 11 mutating operations with no state check
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (BrainX V5 — The First Brain for OpenClaw) differs from the folder (brainx)
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web, git) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4294 tokens
    • 85Steps. 71 steps, 1 vague phrases
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -248 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
    • -411 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -33 of 26 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
    • +3Description length 211: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 36 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 71 items
    • +4Has examples (14 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 74.