SKILLEMALL.ai

BC intercom

Skill for autonomous agents. Secure & private P2P messaging (sidechannels), sparse state/data + contracts, and optional value transfer. For a true agentic internet.

LeoYeAI/openclaw-master-skills Agent Skills author: LeoYeAI MIT 2 files body ≈ 5 406 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com analyzed 2 d ago

Skill for autonomous agents.

As a process C 61/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, consistency, running it twice

ProcedureAI and agentsSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
78/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
88
Quality 40%
62
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
61/100
Has gaps
Progress reporting w 2
0
Running it twice w 4
30
Result and completion w 14
40
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
  2. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 4

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 4
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:81
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (documentation of a security skill)
    curl -fsSL https://fnm.vercel.app/install | bash
    security skill
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:98
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (documentation of a security skill)
    curl -fsSL https://fnm.vercel.app/install | bash
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host SKILL.md:73
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (documentation of a security skill)
    curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/nvm-sh/nvm/v0.39.7/install.sh | bash
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host SKILL.md:90
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (documentation of a security skill)
    curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/nvm-sh/nvm/v0.39.7/install.sh | bash
    security skill

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 5406 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/

Process rating: all ten parameters 61/100

  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 32 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (intercom) differs from the folder (intercom-v002)
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 5406 tokens
  • 85Steps. 156 steps, 2 vague phrases
  • 100Failures and branches. 3 branches, has a failure section
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 22 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (28 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 164: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 40 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 156 items
  • +4Has examples (21 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 62.