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BC signalradar

SignalRadar — Monitor Polymarket prediction markets for probability changes and send alerts when thresholds are crossed. Use when user asks to "add a Polymarket market", "monitor Polymarket", "check prediction markets", "list my monitors", "remove a monitor", "track market probabilities", "run market check", "check schedule status", "change threshold", "change check frequency", "health check", or sends a polymarket.com URL asking to add, check, or learn about a market. When user shares a polymarket.com URL without explicit intent, use `show` to display market info — do NOT auto-add. Do NOT use for stock/crypto trading signals, sports betting, price prediction models, or general financial analysis.

LeoYeAI/openclaw-master-skills Agent Skills author: LeoYeAI MIT 38 files · 1 script body ≈ 6 635 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 d ago

SignalRadar — Monitor Polymarket prediction markets for probability changes and send alerts when thresholds are crossed.

As a process C 62/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

AnalyzerTelegramDiscordSlackAI and agentsInfrastructureData and analyticstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
81/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
79
Quality 40%
85
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
62/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 9

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 9
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url scripts/signalradar.py:3537
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "slack": "https://hooks.slack.com/services/YOUR/WEBHOOK/URL",
    detector
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url scripts/signalradar.py:3538
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "discord": "https://discord.com/api/webhooks/YOUR/WEBHOOK/URL",
    quoted
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-autorun-instruction SKILL.md:93
    Instructs the agent to auto-run a script on every session
    When user asks about current settings, ALWAYS run `signalradar.py config` first. Do NOT guess or recall from memory. If a value is missing, report the default and state "this is the default value".
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url config.example.json:17
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (detector / deny-list definition; security demo / example; test fixture / example file)
    "target": "https://hooks.slack.com/services/YOUR/WEBHOOK/URL"
    detectordemofixture
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url README.md:108
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (detector / deny-list definition; security demo / example)
    "target": "https://hooks.slack.com/services/YOUR/WEBHOOK/URL"
    detectordemo
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url references/config.md:182
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (detector / deny-list definition; security demo / example)
    "target": "https://hooks.slack.com/services/YOUR/WEBHOOK/URL"
    detectordemo
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url references/config.md:195
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    "target": "https://api.telegram.org/bot<TOKEN>/sendMessage?chat_id=<CHAT_ID>"
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url references/config.md:208
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (detector / deny-list definition; security demo / example)
    "target": "https://discord.com/api/webhooks/YOUR/WEBHOOK/URL"
    detectordemo
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url scripts/signalradar.py:3536
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    "telegram": "https://api.telegram.org/bot<TOKEN>/sendMessage?chat_id=<CHAT_ID>",
    placeholder

Files scanned: 38. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 6635 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/

Process rating: all ten parameters 62/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 30Running it twice. 33 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 6635 tokens
  • 85Steps. 82 steps, 2 vague phrases
  • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
  • 100Failures and branches. 5 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 14 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (8 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -316 of 18 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +5Description quotes 11 example trigger phrases
  • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
  • +3Description length 706: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 34 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 82 items
  • +4Has examples (12 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (3 of 9)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 85.