BC ciso-advisor
Use for security leadership decisions: a security program, budget justification in dollars, SOC 2 vs ISO 27001 vs HIPAA roadmap, or board security reporting. Quantifies risk with risk_quantifier.py and tracks compliance with compliance_tracker.py.
Use for security leadership decisions: a security program, budget justification in dollars, SOC 2 vs ISO 27001 vs HIPAA roadmap, or board security reporting.
As a process C 62/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 10
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 10
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/incident_response.md:13Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| SEV-1 (Critical) | Confirmed breach, data exfil, ransomware, production down | Active ransomware, confirmed data theft, complete service outage | Immediate (< 1 hour) | CEO, board within 24 hrs |
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/incident_response.md:22Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)**Critical distinction for response planning:** A ransomware attack is an incident. If data was exfiltrated before encryption, it's also a breach. Assume breach until proven otherwise.
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/incident_response.md:208Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)### Sample Tabletop Scenario: Ransomware
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/incident_response.md:211Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)> It's 6:47 AM on a Monday. Your DevOps engineer receives automated alerts that production databases are inaccessible. By 7:15 AM, they discover a ransomware note demanding $500,000 in Bitcoin. Severa
quoted -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/incident_response.md:298Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- Coverage should include: first-party loss, third-party liability, ransomware, business interruption, regulatory defense
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/security_strategy.md:43Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| Financially motivated criminals | Data theft, ransomware | Phishing, credential stuffing | High |
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/security_strategy.md:59Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- **Direct financial loss**: fraud, ransomware payment, theft
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/security_strategy.md:70Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| Ransomware attack | $350K | 0.20 | $70,000/yr |
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/security_strategy.md:173Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| Series B | $10–50M | 3–5% revenue | +ZTNA, Red team, dedicated CISO |
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/security_strategy.md:178Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)2. Automated backups with tested restore (ransomware defense)
Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 62/100
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 28 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1610 tokens
- 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 247: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 20 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 28 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (3 of 3)
- +3All 2 scripts are documented
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 95.