BB war-room
Convenes a multi-LLM expert panel to pressure-test hard-to-reverse decisions. Use when reversibility score is low and adversarial review is warranted.
Convenes a multi-LLM expert panel to pressure-test hard-to-reverse decisions.
As a process B 65/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, running it twice
Runs in: Hermes Agent
How to improve
- For Hermes the description must be one sentence under 60 characters; move the conditions to a "When to Use" section.
For the model run — optional
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 19
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 19
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitymodules/deliberation-protocol.md:49Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| Phase 4: Red Team | <-- Red Team Commander
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitymodules/deliberation-protocol.md:222Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)### Phase 4: Red Team and Wargaming
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitymodules/deliberation-protocol.md:226Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)**Expert**: Red Team Commander (Gemini Flash)
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitymodules/deliberation-protocol.md:251Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- All COAs with Red Team challenges
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitymodules/deliberation-protocol.md:308Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- Experts revise positions based on Red Team feedback
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitymodules/discussion-publishing.md:114Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| Red Team | ... | ... |
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitymodules/discussion-publishing.md:128Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)4. **Red Team Challenges**: key challenges and responses (Phase 4)
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitymodules/discussion-publishing.md:131Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)> Phases 5-6 (War Game execution and Decision Briefing) are internal deliberation artifacts that don't warrant separate comments. Their outputs are incorporated into the Red Team Challenges and Suprem
quoted -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitymodules/expert-roles.md:70Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)"role": "Red Team Commander",
quoted -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitymodules/expert-roles.md:205Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| Red Team | Red Team Commander | - |
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitymodules/expert-roles.md:257Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- **Sonnet** for Strategist, Intel, Tactician, Red Team: strong reasoning at moderate cost
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitymodules/merkle-dag.md:44Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)expert_role: str # "Intelligence Officer", "Red Team", etc.
quoted -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitymodules/merkle-dag.md:234Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)# Present to Red Team anonymized
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitymodules/reversibility-assessment.md:142Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)*Recommendation*: Convene full council. Extensive Red Team review required.
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:81Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| Red Team | Gemini Flash | Adversarial challenge, failure modes |
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:92Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| Red Team Commander | Gemini Flash | Adversarial challenge |
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:107Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- Phase 4: Red Team Review (all COAs)
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:305Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- Red Team challenges
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:431Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)4. **Phase 4 (Red Team)**: Red-team teammate receives all COAs, posts challenges; other teammates can **respond to challenges in real-time**
Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-long-hermesdescription is 150 chars; the Hermes authoring standard requires ≤ 60 (one sentence, ending with a period) - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "alwaysApply" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "complexity" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "model_hint" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "estimated_tokens" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "progressive_loading" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "modules" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "dependencies" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "tools" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "role"
Process rating: all ten parameters 65/100
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 16 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4272 tokens
- 85Steps. 85 steps, 1 vague phrases
- 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
- 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- low 17 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
- high The skill tells the model to perform an irreversible action with no human approval
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 150: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 49 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 85 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (15 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 78.