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DC TeamClaw

A high-performance Agent subsystem for complex multi-agent orchestration. It provides a visual workflow canvas (OASIS) to coordinate OpenClaw agents, automated computer use tasks, and real-time monitoring via a dedicated Web UI. Supports Telegram/QQ bot integrations and Cloudflare Tunnel for secure remote access.

Not recommendedlow grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: hou xinyuan v0.1.3 63 files · 8 scripts body ≈ 12 398 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 4 d ago

As a process C 59/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, execution cost

IntegrationTelegramCloudflareAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
58/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
59
Quality 40%
57
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
59/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
20
Execution cost w 6
40
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 17

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 17
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key chatbot/QQbot.py:22
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key chatbot/telegrambot.py:14
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key oasis/server.py:713
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host scripts/setup_env.sh:17
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
    curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key src/llm_factory.py:84
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key src/mainagent.py:450
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/tunnel.py:88
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)
    sudo mv cloudflared /usr/local/bin/  # 系统路径
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/tunnel.py:103
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)
    sudo mv cloudflared /usr/local/bin/  # 系统路径
    code literal
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal selfskill/scripts/adduser.py:28
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)
    username, password = sys.argv[1], sys.argv[2]
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process selfskill/scripts/run.sh:47
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    nohup python scripts/launcher.py > "$PROJECT_ROOT/logs/launcher.log" 2>&1 &
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv selfskill/scripts/run.sh:54
    Reads a .env file
    source config/.env 2>/dev/null || true
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv selfskill/scripts/run.sh:101
    Reads a .env file
    source config/.env 2>/dev/null || true
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process SKILL.md:1316
    Starts a background / autostarted process (documentation of a security skill)
    nohup python scripts/tunnel.py > logs/tunnel.log 2>&1 &
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process SKILL.md:1380
    Starts a background / autostarted process (documentation of a security skill)
    nohup python scripts/tunnel.py > logs/tunnel.log 2>&1 &
    security skill
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url src/mcp_bark.py:114
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (security demo / example; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    :param public_url: The public URL (e.g. "https://xxx.trycloudflare.com")
    demoquoted
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege src/mcp_commander.py:94
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)
    "> /dev/sd", "chmod 777 /", "chown root", "/etc/passwd", "/etc/shadow",
    code literal
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url src/mcp_telegram.py:24
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    TELEGRAM_API = f"https://api.telegram.org/bot{TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN}"
    placeholder

Files scanned: 61. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning name-format name should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)
  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 12398 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "user-invokable"

Process rating: all ten parameters 59/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 40Execution cost. Instruction body is 12398 tokens: crowds the task out of the window
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python, node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 70Failures and branches. 4 branches
  • 100Steps. 117 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • low 27 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (4 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -4Absolute local paths (C:\Users, /home/…): not portable
  • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
  • -212 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • -35 of 7 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 314: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 83 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 117 items
  • +4Has examples (58 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 57.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
TeamClaw’s multi-agent features are coherent, but it exposes broad agent, file, command, and public-web controls with weak credential handling that users should review before installing.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 28 May 2026