BD harness-engineering
Agent Harness 构建规范——当 AI 通过编程构建 harness agent(coding agent / 自动化 agent / 长时运行 agent)时,读取本 skill 作为参考标准,确保产出符合 harness 工程架构:Loop / Provider / Tools / Permissions / Session / Compaction / Prompts & Skills / Extensions 七层 + Delivery。覆盖设计决策、可运行 Python 代码模板、长时运行模式。触发词:coding agent、agent loop、tool calling、context management、session persistence、agent harness、构建 agent。Use this skill when the user asks to build a coding agent / automation agent / long-running agent / agent harness.
Agent Harness 构建规范——当 AI 通过编程构建 harness agent(coding agent / 自动化 agent / 长时运行 agent)时,读取本 skill 作为参考标准,确保产出符合 harness 工程架构:Loop / Provider / Tools /…
As a process D 45/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
-
high Dangerous commands
cmd-destructive-fsreferences/code-templates.md:764Destructive filesystem command (wipes root/home/drive) (detector / deny-list definition)dangerous = ["rm -rf /", "rm -rf ~", "sudo rm", ":(){:|:&};:"]detector
Medium and low: 1
-
low Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegereferences/code-templates.md:764Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition)dangerous = ["rm -rf /", "rm -rf ~", "sudo rm", ":(){:|:&};:"]detector
Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "description_zh" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "description_en" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "agent_created"
Process rating: all ten parameters 45/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
- 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (harness-engineering) differs from the folder (harness-engineering-skill)
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
- 100Steps. 29 steps
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 854 tokens
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +4No input/output examples
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 477: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 12 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 29 items
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (5 of 5)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 81.