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AB cyber-security-engineer

Security engineering workflow for OpenClaw privilege governance and hardening. Use for least-privilege execution, approval-first privileged actions, idle timeout controls, port + egress monitoring, and ISO 27001/NIST-aligned compliance reporting with mitigations.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: FletcherFrimpong v0.1.9 MIT-0 27 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 1 881 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 72/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: running it twice

ProcedureInfrastructureData and analyticsSecuritytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
92/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
93
Quality 40%
90
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
72/100
Nearly there
Running it twice w 4
30
When it triggers w 12
50
Tools and files w 18
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

The same skill appears in 1 more place: ClawHub

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 3

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 3
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/install-openclaw-runtime-hook.sh:138
      Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
      PLIST="${HOME}/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.gateway.plist"
      code literal
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/guarded_privileged_exec.py:74
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed; documentation of a security skill)
      return "binary has setuid/setgid bit set"
      code literalsecurity skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/guarded_privileged_exec.py:97
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed; documentation of a security skill)
      return "command binary has setuid/setgid bit set"
      code literalsecurity skill

    Files scanned: 27. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 72/100

    • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 65Failures and branches. 3 branches
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 85 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1881 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +4No input/output examples
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 263: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 8 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 85 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 2)
    • +3All 14 scripts are documented

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 90.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This is a coherent security tool, but it changes how sudo is reached by OpenClaw and leaves several high-impact controls configurable by environment variables, so it needs review before installation.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 28 May 2026