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BD douyin-auto-reply

抖音自动回复技能。通过浏览器自动化连接抖音创作者中心，监控评论，智能分析后自动生成积极、大方、热情、合法的回复。支持关键词匹配、敏感词过滤、评论分类、多账号管理。触发场景：用户提到"抖音自动回复"、"抖音评论回复"、"抖音客服"、"抖音智能回复"、"抖音机器人"等关键词，或明确要求在抖音平台进行自动回复操作。

ClawHub Agent Skills author: hexiuqian v1.0.1 MIT-0 36 files body ≈ 2 757 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 46/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ReferenceInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
86/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
98
Quality 40%
67
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
46/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 2

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 2
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege config/browser_config.json:15
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)
    "--disable-setuid-sandbox"
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/browser_manager.js:26
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)
    '--disable-setuid-sandbox'
    code literal

Files scanned: 36. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "updated"

Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (douyin-auto-reply) differs from the folder (recall-tao)
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 50 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2757 tokens
  • low 17 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -245 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
  • -314 of 17 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +5Description quotes 3 example trigger phrases
  • +3Description length 155: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 51 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 50 items
  • +4Has examples (26 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 67.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a disclosed Douyin auto-reply tool, but it needs Review because it can post from logged-in accounts, retain session/activity data, and includes stealth and human-mimicry behavior.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026