SKILLEMALL.ai

BD ai-interview

🤖 AI 面试系统 - 完整的 AI 面试解决方案 提供求职者和面试官两个 AI Agent,支持飞书群聊面试 + 实时可视化观察。 **功能:** - 👨‍💻 job-seeker - AI 求职者(3年前端,微前端经验) - 👨‍💼 recruiter - AI 面试官(提问、评估候选人) - 📊 web-viewer - 实时可视化观察面板 **依赖:** - 飞书应用 x2(job-seeker + recruiter) - MoonShot API Key **触发词:** - "安装 ai-interview" - "安装面试系统" - "ai-interview"

ClawHub Agent Skills author: jeeban v1.0.0 MIT-0 7 files · 1 script body ≈ 805 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 46/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationPeople and hiringAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
88/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
78
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
46/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Broad scope meta-agent-memory-dump config/job-seeker/IDENTITY.md
    Agent memory / workspace files bundled with the skill (2) — likely a workspace dump with personal data or tokens
    config/job-seeker/IDENTITY.md, config/recruiter/IDENTITY.md

Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (ai-interview) differs from the folder (ai-interview-system)
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 8 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 805 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +5Description quotes 3 example trigger phrases
  • +3Description length 302: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 14 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 8 items
  • +4Has examples (8 code blocks)
  • +3All 1 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 78.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This AI interview skill is plausible, but its viewer can expose and delete OpenClaw session history more broadly than the documentation explains.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026