SKILLEMALL.ai

BC greenhelix-agent-threat-intel-exchange

Agent Threat Intelligence Exchange. Build agent-to-agent threat intelligence marketplaces: STIX/TAXII feed listing, paywall-gated IOC access, reputation-verified intel quality, autonomous SLA negotiation, and compliance-ready audit trails. Includes detailed Python code examples for every pattern.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: mirni v1.3.1 MIT-0 2 files body ≈ 19 491 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 4 d ago

As a process C 50/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

AnalyzerAI and agentsSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
83/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
99
Quality 40%
60
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
50/100
Has gaps
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
Execution cost w 6
10
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
  2. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:128
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "description": "Command and control domain associated with APT29 campaign targeting energy sector",
    detector

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 19491 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "type"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "price_usd"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "content_type"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "executable"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "install"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "credentials"

Process rating: all ten parameters 50/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 10Execution cost. Instruction body is 19491 tokens: crowds the task out of the window
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 22 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 65Failures and branches. 3 branches
  • 100Steps. 30 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 297: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 41 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 30 items
  • +4Has examples (15 code blocks)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 60.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a non-executing guide, but its examples under-disclose authenticated live API actions that can create financial, contractual, and sensitive threat-intelligence records.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026