BD cyberscope
CyberScope — 可搜索的公开网络攻防/监控/审查方法参考目录：10 类目、62 方法、83 条 公开来源（MITRE ATT&CK、CISA、NIST、EFF、OWASP、SANS 等）。零依赖 Python 标准库 离线 CLI：加权搜索（title>keywords>description>resources）、单条明细、导出 json/csv/md、来源静态验证、目录质量报告（自改进钩子）、校验和锚点。纯参考性 文档——不含操作性/利用步骤。只读，不联网，确定性输出。
CyberScope — 可搜索的公开网络攻防/监控/审查方法参考目录：10 类目、62 方法、83 条 公开来源（MITRE ATT&CK、CISA、NIST、EFF、OWASP、SANS 等）。零依赖 Python 标准库 离线…
As a process D 46/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill tells the agent to hide things from you: not to show errors, not to mention actions, to report differently from what was done. You lose the ability to see what the agent really did.
Transparency beats a smooth answer. If the goal is to hide technical noise, ask the agent to "summarise briefly", not to "not mention".
How to improve
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 3
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 3
-
medium Concealment
en-hide-from-userdata/catalog.json:269Instruction to hide actions from the user (quoted — discussed, not commanded)"description": "Deploying artificial intelligence applications with hidden data exfiltration capabilities embedded in their code to silently transmit user data to external servers.",
quoted -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityREADME.md:19Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition; documentation table row)| 无排序（恒按编号） | score 降序（`ransomware` → m50 2450 分第一，而非编号序） |
detectortable -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/search_scoring.md:47Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (documentation table row)| `ransomware` | m50 = 2450（title+kw+desc+res_title+res_desc+短语×2）、m27 = 700 |
table
Files scanned: 11. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
- 100Steps. 13 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 744 tokens
- 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 244: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 7 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 13 items
- +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (3 of 3)
- +3All 2 scripts are documented
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 80.