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AB shift

Multi-identity delegation for OpenClaw. Turns a single agent into a system of specialized sub-identities (coding, research, quick tasks) each powered by different AI models. Use when: (1) the user asks a coding task (write, debug, implement, refactor, explain code), (2) the user asks for research, analysis, comparison, or explanation, (3) the user asks a quick question, lookup, or reminder, (4) the user asks anything that would benefit from a specialized model. NOT for: trivial greetings, acknowledgments, or meta-conversation about the chat itself. SHIFT handles routing, delegation, sub-identity-to-sub-identity consultation, synthesis, and cost management entirely within one conversation.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: palxislabs v1.0.4 MIT-0 15 files · 1 script body ≈ 3 886 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 69/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions

AnalyzerSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
92/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
99
Quality 40%
81
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
69/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
50
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security README.md:293
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      `scripts/setup.sh` only creates local directories and copies files. No network calls, no privilege escalation.

    Files scanned: 15. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • warning frontmatter-yaml SKILL.md: the frontmatter is not valid YAML (YAML parse error: Nested mappings are not allowed in compact mappings at line 2, column 14: description: Multi-identity delegation for OpenClaw. Turns a single agent into … ^ ); fields were read line by line. The usual cause is a colon inside an unquoted value

    Process rating: all ten parameters 69/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 65 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 4 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3886 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • low 21 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
    • +3Description length 697: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 47 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 65 items
    • +4Has examples (21 code blocks)
    • +3All 1 scripts are documented

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 81.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    SHIFT appears purpose-built for multi-model delegation, but it should be reviewed because it can automatically share conversation history, file contents, and memory excerpts with configured model providers while hiding delegation by default and misstating network permissions in metadata.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026