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AB preqstation

Delegate PREQSTATION coding tasks to Claude Code, Codex CLI, or Gemini CLI with PTY-safe execution (workdir + background + monitoring). Use when building, refactoring, or reviewing code in mapped workspaces. NOT for one-line edits or read-only inspection.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: sonim1 v0.1.8 5 files body ≈ 3 549 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 78/100 · Nearly there — no weak spots found

IntegrationSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
93/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
91
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
78/100
Nearly there
When it triggers w 12
50
Tools and files w 18
60
Result and completion w 14
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten
This is a copy of a skill from another catalog; the rating counts the canonical one: preqstation (ClawHub)

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • medium Broad scope meta-agent-memory-dump MEMORY.md
      Agent memory / workspace files bundled with the skill (1) — likely a workspace dump with personal data or tokens
      MEMORY.md

    Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 78/100

    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, git) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 130 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 17 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3549 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 21 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
    • low The response is described with custom markup (23 tags): a typed call is more reliable

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
    • +3Description length 255: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 29 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 130 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (11 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 91.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This skill is coherent for delegating coding work, but it can start background code-changing agents with approval and sandbox bypass flags, so users should review it carefully before installing.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 28 May 2026