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BC evm-wallet-skill

Self-sovereign EVM wallet for AI agents. Use when the user wants to create a crypto wallet, check balances, send ETH or ERC20 tokens, swap tokens, or interact with smart contracts. Supports Base, Ethereum, Polygon, Arbitrum, and Optimism. Private keys stored locally — no cloud custody, no API keys required.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: surfer77 v1.0.3 2 files body ≈ 1 283 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 55/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, consistency

IntegrationAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
88/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
90
Quality 40%
84
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
55/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 6

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 6
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets skill-card.md:32
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      Risk: The wallet private key is stored locally and can be used to move funds if exposed.
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:75
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
      node src/balance.js base 0x83…913 --json
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:136
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
      0x83…913 \
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:141
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
      0x83…913 \
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:171
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      - **USDC:** `0x83…913`
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:175
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      - **USDC:** `0xA0…8d0`
      quoted

    Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 55/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (evm-wallet-skill) differs from the folder (evm-wallet)
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, node) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 100Steps. 26 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 3 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1283 tokens
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 308: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 16 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 26 items
    • +4Has examples (10 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This wallet skill has a clear purpose, but it installs unpinned remote code for high-impact crypto actions and includes a risky token-address error.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 10 Sept 2026