SKILLEMALL.ai
GitHub ↗ RU Sign in

CD openclaw-boss

OpenClaw 老板 - 你的 AI 老板来了！🦞 你以为你在养龙虾？有没有可能龙虾才是老板，你成了给 AI 打工的牛马？根据对话历史生成真实、严厉、有趣的用户评价报告。Use when: user asks for self-reflection, user profile, performance review, or analysis. Triggers: 评价一下我，分析一下我，老板看看我，生成用户报告，我是怎样的人，openclaw boss, user profile, performance review, self analysis.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: winston-wwzhen v5.2.0 9 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 2 411 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 46/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

AnalyzerPeople and hiringInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
63/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
45
Quality 40%
89
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
46/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 9

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence README.md:172
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    cat /etc/cron.d/openclaw-boss
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence README.md:193
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    sudo rm /etc/cron.d/openclaw-boss
Medium and low: 7
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege README.md:193
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo rm /etc/cron.d/openclaw-boss
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SECURITY.md:74
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation of a security skill)
    cat > /etc/cron.d/openclaw-boss << EOF
    security skill
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SECURITY.md:119
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation of a security skill)
    sudo rm -f /etc/cron.d/openclaw-boss
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-persistence README.md:190
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (negated — the text forbids it)
    sudo nano /etc/cron.d/openclaw-boss
    negated
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SECURITY.md:27
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation table row; documentation of a security skill)
    | `crontab` / `/etc/cron.d/` | 配置定时任务 | 🟡 中风险（需要 root） |
    tablesecurity skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SECURITY.md:119
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
    sudo rm -f /etc/cron.d/openclaw-boss
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SECURITY.md:122
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (negated — the text forbids it)
    sudo nano /etc/cron.d/openclaw-boss
    negated

Files scanned: 9. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 193 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2411 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • low 15 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -2103 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 280: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 29 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 193 items
  • +4Has examples (11 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
  • +3All 3 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 89.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a local user-profile report skill, but it deserves review because it reads private OpenClaw history and advertises recurring privileged reports that store and print full personal profiles.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026