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CB ceaser-send

Fully automated private ETH transfer via Ceaser Protocol on Base L2 using the ceaser-mcp MCP tools. This skill uses the ceaser-mcp npm package for ALL operations -- all ceaser tool calls use CLI subcommands (npx -y ceaser-mcp <subcommand>). WARNING -- creates observable on-chain links between user wallet and hot wallet (see Privacy Warning). Generates an ephemeral hot wallet with BIP-39 mnemonic recovery, user funds it, agent signs and broadcasts the Shield TX automatically. Exactly one manual step required (funding the hot wallet with ETH). Uses Noir/UltraHonk zero-knowledge proofs.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Zyra-V21 v1.3.0 6 files body ≈ 7 196 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 66/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, running it twice

IntegrationAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
71/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
69
Quality 40%
73
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
66/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
20
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 11

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 11
  • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
    Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
    allowed-tools: Bash
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:175
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    - `mnemonic` -- The 12-word BIP-39 recovery phrase.
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:369
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    - BIP-39 mnemonic words contain only ASCII lowercase letters (a-z), no shell special characters
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:660
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    **Risk minimization:** The agent executes the Shield TX as quickly as possible after funding is confirmed. The window between funding and Shield TX is minimized. Additionally, the user has the mnemoni
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:688
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    - The agent generates and shows a temporary mnemonic phrase during the flow
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token helpers/wallet-ops.js:19
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    const GAS_ORACLE_ADDR = '0x42…00F';
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token mcporter.json:13
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "CEASER_CONTRACT_ADDRESS": "0x27…368"
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:35
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…jgR+Mkmf+D189…ihQ==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:15
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    **Contract:** `0x27…368`
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:296
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    - `unsignedTx.to` -- Must be `0x27…368`
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:308
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    - `unsignedTx.to` == `0x27…368`
    detector

Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 7196 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 66/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 96 mutating operations with no state check
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 7196 tokens
  • 85Steps. 152 steps, 2 vague phrases
  • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
  • 100Failures and branches. 19 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 16 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 590: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 70 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 152 items
  • +4Has examples (22 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 73.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is clearly intended to automate a Ceaser ETH transfer, but it gives the agent direct control over wallet secrets and irreversible on-chain transactions with limited built-in safeguards.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 28 May 2026