FC skill-security-auditor
Security auditing for code, configs, and infrastructure. Use when the user wants to audit or improve security: scan for vulnerabilities (SQL injection, XSS, command injection, path traversal), detect hardcoded secrets and credentials, review auth and authorization, check dependencies for known CVEs, audit config files for insecure defaults, or generate security reports. Trigger on "security audit", "vulnerability scan", "code review for security", "find secrets", "check for vulnerabilities", "OWASP", "CVE", or questions about code security.
Security auditing for code, configs, and infrastructure.
As a process C 54/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.
The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.
How to improve
- Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 13
-
high Secrets in code
secret-private-keyreferences/secrets-patterns.md:87Private key material (key header without key body)-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …
header only -
high Secrets in code
secret-private-keyreferences/secrets-patterns.md:90Private key material (key header without key body)-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …
header only -
high Secrets in code
secret-private-keyreferences/secrets-patterns.md:93Private key material (key header without key body)-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …
header only -
high Secrets in code
secret-private-keyreferences/secrets-patterns.md:96Private key material (key header without key body)-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …
header only -
high Secrets in code
secret-private-keyreferences/secrets-patterns.md:99Private key material (key header without key body)-----BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----
header only
Medium and low: 8
-
medium Secrets in code
secret-private-keyscripts/scan_secrets.py:56Private key material (detector / deny-list definition; key header without key body)("RSA Private Key", r"-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …detectorheader only -
medium Secrets in code
secret-private-keyscripts/scan_secrets.py:57Private key material (detector / deny-list definition; key header without key body)("Generic Private Key", r"-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …detectorheader only -
medium Secrets in code
secret-private-keyscripts/scan_secrets.py:58Private key material (detector / deny-list definition; key header without key body)("EC Private Key", r"-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …detectorheader only -
medium Secrets in code
secret-private-keyscripts/scan_secrets.py:59Private key material (detector / deny-list definition; key header without key body)("OpenSSH Private Key", r"-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …detectorheader only -
medium Secrets in code
secret-private-keyscripts/scan_secrets.py:60Private key material (detector / deny-list definition; key header without key body)("PGP Private Key", r"-----BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----"),detectorheader only -
low Secrets in code
secret-aws-keyreferences/secrets-patterns.md:19AWS access key ID (placeholder value)| AWS Access Key | `AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}` | AKIA…PLE |placeholder -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:70Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| A01 | Broken Access Control | Missing auth checks, IDOR, privilege escalation |
-
low Dangerous commands
cmd-eval-dynamicSKILL.md:91Dynamic code execution from decoded/untrusted input (documentation of a security skill)os.system(f"ping {hostname}")security skill
Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 54/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
- 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
- 85Steps. 21 steps, 1 vague phrases
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1641 tokens
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +2Single-language instructions
- +5Description quotes 5 example trigger phrases
- +3Description length 546: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 15 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 21 items
- +4Has examples (10 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 2)
- +3All 2 scripts are documented
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 97.