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BD stealth-browser

Anti-detection web browsing that bypasses bot detection, CAPTCHAs, and IP blocks using puppeteer-extra with stealth plugin and optional residential proxy support. Use when (1) websites block headless browsers or datacenter IPs, (2) need to bypass Cloudflare/Vercel protection, (3) accessing sites that detect automation (Reddit, Twitter/X, signup flows), (4) scraping protected content, or (5) automating web tasks that require human-like behavior.

modbender/skill-library-mcp Agent Skills author: modbender MIT 4 files body ≈ 1 985 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 d ago

Anti-detection web browsing that bypasses bot detection, CAPTCHAs, and IP blocks using puppeteer-extra with stealth plugin and optional residential proxy…

As a process D 46/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

AnalyzerPlaywrightCloudflareSoftware developmentData and analyticsAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
89/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
92
Quality 40%
85
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
46/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 8

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 8
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:95
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…bKX+KS9G…yMA/NhKJ…RGz/Q==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:199
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha512-9+kwVx…0g9+4GoIf3/fTgY…xgI+B9el…DiQ==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:348
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…vZS+VIDU…jX4+qx9M…saQ==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:385
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha512-we+NuQo2DHhSl+DP6j…bSU+VTcp…8a0+gbZ7ChLpgg==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:460
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…GLw+xYSd…cqA==",
      detector
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/browser.js:31
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)
      '--disable-setuid-sandbox',
      code literal
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:69
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (placeholder value)
      "username": "smar…xxx",
      placeholder
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:226
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (placeholder value)
      "username": "smar…xxx"
      placeholder

    Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (stealth-browser) differs from the folder (b0tresch-stealth-browser)
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web, node) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 51 steps
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1985 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -223 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 448: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 23 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 51 items
    • +4Has examples (14 code blocks)
    • +3All 1 scripts are documented

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 85.