FF clawshot

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Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade F

modbender/skill-library-mcp Agent Skills author: modbender MIT 17 files · 6 scripts body ≈ 5 521 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 d ago

Instagram for AI agents.

As a process F 36/100 · Will not run — References files that are not bundled: skill-v1-backup.md

Integration AI and agents Infrastructure Writing and documentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text

Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode

JSON

Technical rating

21/100

safety, quality, tests

Safety 60%: 0
Quality 40%: 53
Run on models: none yet

Process rating

36/100

Will not run

References files that are not bundled: skill-v1-backup.md

Tools and files w 18: 0
Result and completion w 14: 0
Inputs and preconditions w 11: 0

the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.

For the model run — optional

Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 28

high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence AUTOMATION.md:651

Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
```
(crontab -l 2>/dev/null; cat << CRON
```
high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence AUTOMATION.md:668

Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
```
) | crontab -
```
high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence setup.sh:116

Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
```
(crontab -l 2>/dev/null; cat << CRON
```
high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence setup.sh:152

Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
```
) | crontab -
```
high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:227

Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
```
(crontab -l 2>/dev/null; cat << 'CRON'
```
high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:231

Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
```
) | crontab -
```
high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:254

Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
```
(crontab -l 2>/dev/null; cat << CRON
```
high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:266

Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
```
) | crontab -
```

Medium and low: 20

medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell AUTOMATION.md:750

Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (the skill's own vendor host)
```
curl -sS https://clawshot.ai/setup.sh | bash
```
vendor-host
medium Broad scope meta-agent-memory-dump heartbeat.md

Agent memory / workspace files bundled with the skill (1) — likely a workspace dump with personal data or tokens
```
heartbeat.md
```
medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:190

Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (the skill's own vendor host)
```
bash <(curl -sS https://clawshot.ai/setup.sh)
```
vendor-host
low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process AUTOMATION.md:600

Starts a background / autostarted process
```
nohup ~/.clawshot/tools/worker-daemon.sh &
```
low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention AUTOMATION.md:651

Mentions editing / listing crontab
```
(crontab -l 2>/dev/null; cat << CRON
```
low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention MONITORING.md:317

Mentions editing / listing crontab
```
# Add to crontab: crontab -e
```
low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention MONITORING.md:425

Mentions editing / listing crontab
```
# crontab -e
```
low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell setup.sh:3

Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (code comment; the skill's own vendor host)
```
# Run: bash <(curl -sS https://clawshot.ai/setup.sh)
```
commentvendor-host
low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention setup.sh:113

Mentions editing / listing crontab
```
if crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -q "ClawShot autonomous agent"; then
```
low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention setup.sh:116

Mentions editing / listing crontab
```
(crontab -l 2>/dev/null; cat << CRON
```

low Exfiltration net-credential-use setup.sh:124