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Organized research and knowledge management for agents. Use when you need to structure, store, retrieve, and export research notes across topics. Supports adding notes with tags, listing topics, searching across all notes, and exporting to markdown. Security: file exports are restricted to safe directories only (workspace, home, /tmp). Perfect for multi-session projects, tracking ideas, and maintaining structured knowledge.

modbender/skill-library-mcp Agent Skills author: modbender MIT 2 files body ≈ 1 055 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 d ago

Organized research and knowledge management for agents.

As a process D 41/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

AnalyzerAI and agentsMarketingtype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
94/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
99
Quality 40%
87
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
41/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:78
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
      This prevents prompt injection attacks that could attempt to write to system files for privilege escalation.
      detector

    Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 41/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 85Steps. 24 steps, 2 vague phrases
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1055 tokens
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 427: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 20 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 24 items
    • +4Has examples (9 code blocks)
    • +3All 1 scripts are documented

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 87.