BC auditing-foundry-smart-contract-security
Pre-deployment security audit of Solidity smart contracts in a Foundry project. Combines static analysis (Slither, Aderyn), symbolic execution (Mythril), and property-based testing (forge fuzz + invariant tests with handlers) to catch reentrancy, access-control, oracle/price manipulation, and arithmetic bugs BEFORE deploying to an EVM chain. Also enforces key hygiene (no plaintext private keys, encrypted cast keystore) and a secure deploy workflow. Use when writing, reviewing, testing, or deploying Solidity/Foundry contracts, building a dApp, or working with forge/cast/anvil, MetaMask, or Web3/DeFi code.
Pre-deployment security audit of Solidity smart contracts in a Foundry project.
As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.
Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 2
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medium Risky intent
intent-wallet-secretsreferences/secure-deployment-and-keys.md:9Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target1. **A real private key or seed phrase NEVER touches a file, env var, shell history, or git.**
A further 1 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.
Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "domain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "subdomain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "based_on" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "swc_registry" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 13 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Steps. 18 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1623 tokens
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 611: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 13 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 18 items
- +4Has examples (6 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (3 of 3)
- +3All 1 scripts are documented
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 89.