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BB conducting-cyber-risk-assessment-with-nist-800-30

Conduct a defensible cybersecurity risk assessment using the NIST SP 800-30 Rev 1 methodology: prepare scope and a risk model, identify threat sources and threat events, identify vulnerabilities and predisposing conditions, determine likelihood and impact, compute risk, and communicate results as a prioritized risk register. Use when an organization needs an actual risk *assessment* (not a maturity score), when a control framework (CSF, ISO 27001, RMF, SOC 2, PCI) requires a documented risk analysis as input, when leadership asks "what are our top risks and how bad are they", when assessing risk for a new system or major change, or when building a risk register from scratch. This is the methodology that feeds framework selection, ATO packages, and treatment decisions. Keywords: risk assessment, NIST 800-30, threat modeling, likelihood and impact, risk register, risk analysis, threat sources, vulnerabilities, risk determination, qualitative risk, risk matrix, residual risk, risk treatment.

mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills Agent Skills author: mukul975 Apache-2.0 5 files · 1 script body ≈ 2 125 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Conduct a defensible cybersecurity risk assessment using the NIST SP 800-30 Rev 1 methodology: prepare scope and a risk model, identify threat sources and…

As a process B 72/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: when it triggers, failures and branches, running it twice

AnalyzerPeople and hiringtype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
91/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
85
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
72/100
Nearly there
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 5

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 5
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security assets/template.md:30
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | R-02 | Adversary exploits an unpatched edge VPN to deploy ransomware | Adversarial | T1190 |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security assets/template.md:47
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | R-01 | Phish → lateral movement to IdP | Adversarial | Identity provider | T1566, T1021 | High | Very High | **Very High** | No phishing-resistant MFA; flat network | Mitigate | Moderate | IAM Lead
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security assets/template.md:48
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | R-02 | Ransomware via unpatched edge VPN | Adversarial | VPN concentrator | T1190 | Moderate | Very High | **High** | Missing critical patch | Mitigate | Low | Infra |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security assets/template.md:53
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      1. **R-01 — Very High.** A successful phish into our identity provider is the single most damaging plausible event: it grants broad access and, on a flat network, fast lateral movement. **Recommendati
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security assets/template.md:54
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      2. **R-02 — High.** Edge-VPN ransomware is a sector-common entry path. **Recommendation:** emergency-patch the appliance, restrict the management plane, and validate offline backups.

    Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "domain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "subdomain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 72/100

    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 8 mutating operations with no state check
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 36 steps
    • 100Result and completion. Output format and completion criterion are stated
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2125 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Description length 1003: 120–800 characters recommended
    • +4No input/output examples
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Structure: 13 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 36 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
    • +3All 1 scripts are documented
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 85.