CB detecting-command-and-control-over-dns
Detect command-and-control (C2) traffic tunneled over DNS from tools like Iodine, dnscat2, dns2tcp, and Cobalt Strike DNS beacon, using Shannon entropy analysis of query subdomains, ML-based DGA classification, passive DNS correlation, and Zeek/Suricata signatures. Use when investigating suspected DNS tunneling, classifying DGA domains, detecting DNS beaconing, or building DNS anomaly rules for a SOC/SIEM.
Detect command-and-control (C2) traffic tunneled over DNS from tools like Iodine, dnscat2, dns2tcp, and Cobalt Strike DNS beacon, using Shannon entropy…
As a process B 67/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: execution cost, running it twice
How to improve
- The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 4
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 4
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:35Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)# Detecting Command and Control Over DNS
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:331Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- Known C2 framework patterns
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:1256Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| **Cobalt Strike DNS Beacon** | Commercial C2 framework's DNS communication mode that uses A, AAAA, and TXT records to receive tasks and return results via DNS resolution |
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:1295Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)- Not checking other hosts for similar patterns (lateral movement may have already occurred)
detector
Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
body-longSKILL.md body ≈ 12517 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/ - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "domain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "subdomain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "nist_csf" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
Process rating: all ten parameters 67/100
- 30Running it twice. 9 mutating operations with no state check
- 40Execution cost. Instruction body is 12517 tokens: crowds the task out of the window
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python) that frontmatter does not declare
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Steps. 48 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
- +3Description length 409: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 18 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 48 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (11 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 72.