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CC detecting-container-runtime-threats-with-falco

Deploys and operates Falco with the modern eBPF driver in Kubernetes and Docker, covering driver selection, Helm installation, output channels, and the built-in ruleset that detects container escape, namespace abuse, privileged mounts, and anomalous syscalls. Use when standing Falco up on a cluster, choosing between the eBPF and kernel-module drivers, routing Falco alerts into a SIEM or Falcosidekick, or upgrading an existing deployment. Keywords: Falco, modern_ebpf, kernel module, Helm, Falcosidekick, runtime security, syscall. Do not use for authoring individual escape rules - use detecting-container-escape-with-falco-rules.

mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills Agent Skills author: mukul975 Apache-2.0 5 files · 1 script body ≈ 2 717 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Deploys and operates Falco with the modern eBPF driver in Kubernetes and Docker, covering driver selection, Helm installation, output channels, and the…

As a process C 55/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, failures and branches, running it twice

AnalyzerDockerKubernetesGitHubSecurityAI and agentsPeople and hiringtype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
87/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
92
Quality 40%
79
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
55/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 8

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 8
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:7
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | T1611 | Escape to Host | Privilege Escalation | Falco rules detect the syscalls/files used in container breakout (release_agent, setns, privileged mount). |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:11
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | T1071.001 | Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols | Command and Control | Unexpected outbound connections from containers. |
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:67
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
      sudo tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/falcosecurity.list
      security skill
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:85
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | T1611 | Escape to Host | Privilege Escalation |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:89
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | T1071.001 | Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols | Command and Control |
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process SKILL.md:102
      Starts a background / autostarted process (documentation of a security skill)
      sudo systemctl enable --now falco-modern-bpf.service
      security skill
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:195
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
      - rule: Reverse Shell From Container
      detector
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:204
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      Reverse shell detected in container

    Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "domain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "subdomain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
    • note edit-residue the text marks something as outdated (lines 7): check that old rules are not kept next to new ones — the full check reads the text for contradictions

    Process rating: all ten parameters 55/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, node) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 21 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2717 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -42 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
    • +3Description length 634: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 19 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 21 items
    • +4Has examples (10 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 79.