SKILLEMALL.ai

BB detecting-dll-sideloading-attacks

Detect DLL side-loading and search-order hijacking (MITRE T1574) where adversaries plant malicious DLLs for legitimate signed applications to load, by analyzing Sysmon Event ID 7 DLL-load events, checking signatures/hashes against known-good versions, and flagging path anomalies with EDR tools like CrowdStrike, MDE, or SentinelOne. Use when investigating EDR alerts on unsigned DLLs, hunting for APT persistence via trojanized applications, or triaging incidents involving DLL hijacking.

mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills Agent Skills author: mukul975 Apache-2.0 8 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 875 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Detect DLL side-loading and search-order hijacking (MITRE T1574) where adversaries plant malicious DLLs for legitimate signed applications to load, by…

As a process B 70/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: when it triggers, failures and branches, progress reporting

AnalyzerPeople and hiringtype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
91/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
99
Quality 40%
78
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
70/100
Nearly there
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:6
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - **Tactic**: Persistence (TA0003), Privilege Escalation (TA0004), Defense Evasion (TA0005)

    Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "domain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "subdomain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "d3fend_techniques"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 70/100

    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 21 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 875 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • -43 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 489: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 8 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 21 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 78.