SKILLEMALL.ai

BC detecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs

Detects defense evasion techniques used by adversaries in endpoint logs including log tampering, timestomping, process injection, and security tool disabling. Use when investigating suspicious endpoint behavior, building detection rules for evasion tactics, or conducting threat hunting for stealthy adversary activity. Activates for requests involving evasion detection, defense evasion analysis, log tampering detection, or MITRE ATT&CK TA0005.

mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills Agent Skills author: mukul975 Apache-2.0 8 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 2 194 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Detects defense evasion techniques used by adversaries in endpoint logs including log tampering, timestomping, process injection, and security tool disabling.

As a process C 57/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, failures and branches, running it twice

AnalyzerPeople and hiringtype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
91/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
99
Quality 40%
79
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
57/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1

    ✓ Guard found no suspicious behaviour. 1 matches are attack strings quoted in this security skill's own documentation.

    Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "domain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "subdomain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "d3fend_techniques"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 57/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 18 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2194 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -43 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
    • +3Description length 446: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 13 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 18 items
    • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 79.