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CB detecting-privilege-escalation-attempts

Detect privilege escalation attempts across Windows and Linux, including access token manipulation, UAC bypass, unquoted service path abuse, kernel exploits, and sudo/doas abuse. Use when threat hunting for T1068-style privilege escalation, triaging EDR/SIEM alerts on suspicious privilege changes, scoping compromise during incident response, or validating detection coverage in a purple team exercise.

mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills Agent Skills author: mukul975 Apache-2.0 8 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 693 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Detect privilege escalation attempts across Windows and Linux, including access token manipulation, UAC bypass, unquoted service path abuse, kernel exploits…

As a process B 75/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: failures and branches, running it twice

AnalyzerPeople and hiringtype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
82/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
85
Quality 40%
78
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
75/100
Nearly there
Failures and branches w 10
0
Running it twice w 4
30
Result and completion w 14
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 15

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 15
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security assets/template.md:1
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
      # Detecting Privilege Escalation Attempts - Hunt Template
      detector
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security assets/template.md:24
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - [ ] T1068 - Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:1
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
      # API Reference: Detecting Privilege Escalation Attempts
      detector
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:3
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      ## Windows Privilege Escalation Techniques
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:13
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      ## Linux Privilege Escalation Techniques
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:1
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
      # Standards and References - Detecting Privilege Escalation Attempts
      detector
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:9
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | T1068 | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | See attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068 |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:39
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - Atomic Red Team Tests: https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/workflows.md:1
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
      # Detailed Hunting Workflow - Detecting Privilege Escalation Attempts
      detector
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/workflows.md:48
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - Trace lateral movement and privilege escalation paths
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:3
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
      description: Detect privilege escalation attempts across Windows and Linux, including access token manipulation, UAC bypass, unquoted service path abuse, kernel exploits, and sudo/doas abuse. Use when
      detector
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:35
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
      # Detecting Privilege Escalation Attempts
      detector
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:39
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
      - When proactively hunting for indicators of detecting privilege escalation attempts in the environment
      detector
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:69
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | T1068 | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:88
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      3. **Scenario 3**: PrintSpoofer privilege escalation from service to SYSTEM

    Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "domain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "subdomain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "d3fend_techniques"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 75/100

    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 21 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 693 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • -43 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 403: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 8 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 21 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 78.