CB detecting-t1003-credential-dumping-with-edr
Detect OS credential dumping (MITRE T1003) targeting LSASS memory, the SAM database, NTDS.dit, and cached credentials by correlating EDR telemetry, Sysmon process-access events, and Windows security event logs. Use when hunting for Mimikatz-style credential theft, triaging an EDR alert on LSASS access, or scoping an incident after suspected credential dumping.
Detect OS credential dumping (MITRE T1003) targeting LSASS memory, the SAM database, NTDS.dit, and cached credentials by correlating EDR telemetry, Sysmon…
As a process B 67/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: when it triggers, failures and branches, running it twice
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 17
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 17
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityassets/template.md:1Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)# T1003 Credential Dumping Hunt Template
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityassets/template.md:12Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)> An adversary with elevated privileges is dumping credentials from LSASS memory, SAM database, or NTDS.dit to enable lateral movement and privilege escalation.
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityassets/template.md:36Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)3. **Investigate**: [Lateral movement from compromised credentials]
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/api-reference.md:1Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)# API Reference: T1003 Credential Dumping Detection
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/api-reference.md:14Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)## Sysmon Events for Credential Dumping
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/standards.md:1Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)# Standards and References - T1003 Credential Dumping Detection
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/standards.md:3Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)## MITRE ATT&CK Credential Dumping Sub-Techniques
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/standards.md:14Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)## LSASS Access Masks for Credential Dumping
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/standards.md:35Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)## Known Credential Dumping Tools
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/standards.md:45Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)| LaZagne | Multi-source credential harvesting | lazagne.exe all |
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/workflows.md:1Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)# Detailed Hunting Workflow - T1003 Credential Dumping
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/workflows.md:48Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)## Phase 3: Post-Dump Lateral Movement
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:3Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)description: Detect OS credential dumping (MITRE T1003) targeting LSASS memory, the SAM
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:7Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)credential dumping.
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:67Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)# Detecting T1003 Credential Dumping with EDR
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:88Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)2. **Detect Credential Dumping Tools**: Hunt for known tool signatures -- Mimikatz (sekurlsa::logonpasswords), procdump.exe targeting LSASS, comsvcs.dll MiniDump, and Task Manager creating LSASS dumps
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:92Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)6. **Correlate with Lateral Movement**: After credential dumping, attackers typically move laterally. Correlate credential access events with subsequent remote logon attempts.
Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "domain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "subdomain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "d3fend_techniques" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "nist_csf" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "mitre_f3"
Process rating: all ten parameters 67/100
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 23 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1433 tokens
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- -43 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 362: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 12 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 23 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (5 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 78.