SKILLEMALL.ai

BC detecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon

Detect process injection techniques (T1055) - including DLL injection, process hollowing, and APC injection - by analyzing Sysmon Event IDs 1, 7, 8, 10, and 25 for cross-process memory operations, remote thread creation, and anomalous DLL loads. Use when hunting defense-evasion activity that hides code inside legitimate processes, investigating an EDR alert on suspicious cross-process access, or validating Sysmon coverage for injection detection.

mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills Agent Skills author: mukul975 Apache-2.0 8 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 1 706 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Detect process injection techniques (T1055) - including DLL injection, process hollowing, and APC injection - by analyzing Sysmon Event IDs 1, 7, 8, 10, and…

As a process C 60/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, failures and branches, running it twice

ProcedurePeople and hiringtype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
91/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
99
Quality 40%
78
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
60/100
Has gaps
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/standards.md:32
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | 0x0040 | PROCESS_VM_READ | Medium - credential dumping |

    Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "domain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "subdomain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "d3fend_techniques"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 60/100

    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 7 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 23 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1706 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • -43 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 450: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 13 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 23 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (5 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 78.