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CC detecting-t1548-abuse-elevation-control-mechanism

Detect abuse of elevation control mechanisms (T1548), including Windows UAC bypass via auto-elevating binaries like fodhelper.exe and Linux sudo/setuid/setgid exploitation, by monitoring registry changes, integrity-level transitions, and parent-child process relationships via Sysmon and Windows Security events. Use when hunting privilege-escalation activity or validating elevation-abuse detection coverage.

mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills Agent Skills author: mukul975 Apache-2.0 8 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 1 219 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 5 d ago

Detect abuse of elevation control mechanisms (T1548), including Windows UAC bypass via auto-elevating binaries like fodhelper.exe and Linux sudo/setuid/setgid…

As a process C 62/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, failures and branches, progress reporting

AnalyzerPeople and hiringSecuritytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
85/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
89
Quality 40%
78
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
62/100
Has gaps
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 11

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 11
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/api-reference.md:7
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
      | T1548.001 | Setuid and Setgid | Linux/macOS |
      security skill
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/api-reference.md:47
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      ## Linux Privilege Escalation
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/api-reference.md:67
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation table row; documentation of a security skill)
      | `python` | `sudo python -c 'import os; os.system("/bin/bash")'` |
      tablesecurity skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/standards.md:7
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
      | T1548.001 | Linux/macOS | Setuid and Setgid binary abuse |
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/workflows.md:39
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
      ### Step 3.1 - Setuid Binary Hunting
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:4
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
      bypass via auto-elevating binaries like fodhelper.exe and Linux sudo/setuid/setgid exploitation,
      security skill
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:42
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - When hunting for privilege escalation via UAC bypass in Windows environments
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:46
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
      - When monitoring for setuid/setgid abuse on Linux systems
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:62
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
      5. **Monitor Linux Elevation Abuse**: Track sudo misconfiguration exploitation, setuid binary abuse, and capability manipulation.
      security skill
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:63
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      6. **Correlate with Privilege Escalation Chain**: Map elevation abuse to the broader attack chain, identifying what was done with escalated privileges.
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:70
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
      | T1548.001 | Setuid and Setgid (Linux) |
      security skill

    Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "domain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "subdomain"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "d3fend_techniques"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "nist_csf"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 62/100

    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 21 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1219 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • -43 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 409: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 12 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 21 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (5 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 78.