CC emulating-cloud-attacks-with-stratus-red-team
Install and run Stratus Red Team to detonate granular, MITRE ATT&CK-mapped AWS, Azure, GCP, and Kubernetes attack techniques through their warmup-detonate-revert-cleanup lifecycle, then verify the telemetry they generate. Use to validate that cloud detections (CloudTrail, GuardDuty, Microsoft Sentinel, GCP SCC, Falco) actually fire, or to run a repeatable purple-team exercise generating realistic attacker telemetry.
Install and run Stratus Red Team to detonate granular, MITRE ATT&CK-mapped AWS, Azure, GCP, and Kubernetes attack techniques through their…
As a process C 59/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, failures and branches, running it twice
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 8
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 8
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/api-reference.md:1Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)# Stratus Red Team — Command Reference
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/api-reference.md:18Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| `stratus version` | Print the Stratus Red Team version |
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/standards.md:21Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- Datadog Stratus Red Team — https://stratus-red-team.cloud
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:3Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)description: Install and run Stratus Red Team to detonate granular, MITRE ATT&CK-mapped
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:27Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)# Emulating Cloud Attacks with Stratus Red Team
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:29Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)> **Legal Notice:** This skill is for authorized security testing and detection-validation purposes only. Stratus Red Team spins up and modifies real cloud infrastructure in the account whose credenti
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:33Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)Stratus Red Team is an open-source "Atomic Red Team for the cloud," maintained by Datadog. It is a self-contained Go binary that programmatically *detonates* granular, well-documented offensive techni
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:49Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- Stratus Red Team binary (Go 1.23+ to build from source, or Homebrew/Docker):
Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "domain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "subdomain" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "nist_csf" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "mitre_attack"
Process rating: all ten parameters 59/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 30Running it twice. 7 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Steps. 28 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2633 tokens
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -42 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 419: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 21 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 28 items
- +4Has examples (11 code blocks)
- +3All 1 scripts are documented
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 81.